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Plaintiff-Appellant GLFP, Ltd. ("GLFP"), pursuant to U.R.A.P. 35, petitions
for rehearing of the Panel Opinion filed on April 19, 2007. A copy of the Opinion
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This petition for rehearing is limited to the Panel's
derivative claims holding (Op. at 3-5), and its rejection of the close-corporation
exception (Op. at 7-12). Counsel for GLFP hereby certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
ARGUMENT
L

THE PANEL'S HOLDING THAT GLFP'S CLAIMS ARE
DERIVATIVE MISAPPREHENDS THE RECORD.
The Panel has fundamentally misapprehended the record regarding GLFP's

claim based on reduced or non-existent distributions. In particular, the Court
describes GLFP's argument as based on a claim "that GLFP suffered a harm
distinct from any harm CL Properties suffered when it received reduced
distributions from CL Properties. In essence, GLFP argues that Defendants'
conduct financially injured CL Properties in such a way that CL Properties cannot
make adequate distributions to GLFP. In other words, GLFP was injured because
CL Properties was injured." Op. ^ 10 (emphasis added), Ex. A.
This is not at all what GLFP claimed or alleged. Indeed, GLFP never based
a claim on reduced distributions from CL Properties. Instead, GLFP's claim was
that it received reduced distributions from CL Mgmt because the Clarks were using
CL Mgmt funds - collected from CL Properties - to benefit other Clark holdings.
1

R. at 4-5 (Complaint at ^fl| 12-14). Perhaps the source of the confusion is GLFP's
status as a limited partner of both CL Mgmt and CL Properties. R. at 2 (Complaint
at ^] 4). But the distinction is critical. GLFP did not claim that it was injured as a
result of injuries to CL Properties, and GLFP did not seek damages for injuries to
any entity other than itself. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 9 and Ex. 2, a copy of Ex.
2 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Exhibit 2 graphically depicts that the reduced or
non-existent distributions were from CL Mgmt, not CL Properties. See also R. at
258 (Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment), stating
as follows:
The direct harm to GLFP is that, contrary to the Clarks'
prior representations, the excessive fees do not equally
benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from
CL Mgmt. In other words, the fees come in the front-end
from CL Properties, but do not come out the back-end to
plaintiff.
See also R. at 4-5 (Complaint); 272-273 (Expert Report); Br. of Appellant at 7
("Thus, the direct harm to GLFP was that... the excessive fees did not equally
benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from CL Mgmt; adequate
distributions did not take place because of the commingling and use of the fees to
benefit the Clarks' separate business entities.") (emphasis added).
The Court's analysis, because of its misapprehension of the record, misses
the point. GLFP's injury is not, as stated by the Court, "necessarily linked to the
financial health of CL Properties . . . ." Op. ^ 10. In fact, the financial health of
2

CL Properties has very little to do with this claim. Instead, it is the actions of the
Clarks and CL Mgmt in denying GLFP distributions from CL Mgmt - because the
Clarks are using CL Mgmt funds to benefit other Clark entities - that is the basis
of GLFP's claim and special harm. As noted in GLFP's brief, this harm is unique
to GLFP because the other primary limited partner in CL Mgmt - HCLP (the
"Howard Clark Family Partnership") - is controlled by the Clarks and thus
indirectly benefits from the commingling and diversion of funds. Br. at 10. Thus,
GLFP is uniquely harmed by the commingling. The Clarks certainly are not, and
neither is CL Properties. Therefore, the claim is not derivative.
Because the Court has fundamentally misapprehended the record with
respect to this issue, rehearing is warranted.

II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE CLOSE-CORPORATION
EXCEPTION IS LEGALLY ERRONEOUS
The Court's Opinion rescues the trial court by finding it properly exercised
its discretion - in refusing to allow GLFP to invoke the closely-held limited
partnership exception - even though the record is devoid of any reasoning by the
trial court on this issue. The Opinion supplies a rationale as follows:
The trial court was within its discretion in concluding
that to allow GLFP to proceed individually could subject
Defendants to inconsistent liability to these excluded
parties [MB Management Inc., the GAL Marital
Deduction Trust, and the Howard Clark Family
Partnership], and could "spawn multiple litigation among
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the partnership, the individual partners, and
[Defendants."
Op. at U 23, quoting Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984). But the trial
court made no such finding, perhaps because Defendants never argued this point
below. Defendants first raised the issue in their Answer Brief before this Court.
Br. of Appellee at 29. Thus, the Opinion provides a rationale for the trial court's
exercise of its discretion that was not articulated by the district court, nor argued by
Defendants below. There is nothing in the record, other than rank speculation, to
suggest that any of the entities not named as parties in this case also might assert
claims and thereby subject Defendants to inconsistent liability. Indeed, there is
ample reason to believe otherwise since the Clarks completely control HCFP and
are unlikely to sue themselves, and the GL Marital Trust is controlled by Merline
Learning, and thus could have joined this lawsuit if the Trust were inclined to
assert a claim. Indeed, the fact that the same individuals are involved in all these
entities supports application of the closely-held exception.
The Panel is no doubt correct that the trial court can and should exercise its
discretion on this issue. However, that discretion should be both informed and
articulated, not provided after-the-fact. In providing an erroneous rationale for the
court below, this Court is engaged in speculation and has violated the standards
applicable to a review of summary judgment. If the Panel does not reconsider its
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holding that GLFP's claims are all derivative, it should remand to the trial court for
adequate consideration of the closely-held exception.
Dated this 14th day of May 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

Brent E.(Johnson, 7558
Katherine Norman, 9573
Cecilia M. Romero 9570
Holland & Hart LLP
A. Bruce Jones, CO #11370
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Appellant
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Exhibit A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and McHugh.
McHUGH, Judge:
Hi
GLFP Ltd., a limited partnership, appeals the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of CL Management, Ltd.,
Clark Learning Properties, Howard S. Clark, and H. Scott Clark.
GLFP also appeals the trial court's refusal to allow GLFP to
amend its complaint. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
1(2 Merline Learning and Howard Clark are brother and sister.
Learning is the majority owner of GLFP (the Gerald Learning Family

Partnership).1 Clark is the majority owner of the Howard Clark
Family Partnership. Together, GLFP and the Howard Clark Family
Partnership are also limited partners in another business entity
called Clairk Learning Properties (CL Properties) . As limited
partners, GLFP and the Howard Clark Family Partnership each own
45% of CL Properties. The remaining 10% of CL Properties is
owned by its general manager, CL Management. CL Management is
controlled by Clark and another corporate entity called MB
Management Inc.2 CL Management's primary business purpose is to
manage real estate holdings, including CL Properties's real
estate holdings in Arizona and California.
H3
Starting in 1992, family relations between the Learnings and
the Clarks began to erode due to disputes with respect to their
joint business interests. In particular, the Learnings became
unhappy with the management services that CL Management provided
to CL Properties. In February 2005, GLFP filed a complaint
against Clark and his son H. Scott Clark, CL Management, and CL
Properties (collectively, Defendants) alleging that
(1) Defendants caused CL Management to charge CL Properties
excessive management fees, (2) Defendants caused CL Management to
use those fees to manage properties not owned by CL Properties,
(3) Defendants caused CL Management to mismanage CL Properties's
real estate holdings, and (4) Defendants CL Management and the
Clarks breached a fiduciary duty to GLFP. GLFP also sought
judicial dissolution of CL Properties and CL Management and an
accounting.
t4
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that
GLFP had improperly asserted derivative claims directly, without
having first made demand on CL Properties, contrary to rule 23.1
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted
Defendants' request, finding that all of GLFP's claims---including
its request for judicial dissolution and an accounting--were
based on derivative theories of recovery and, therefore, could
not be brought directly without GLFP first making demand on CL
Properties. The trial court rejected GLFP's argument that it was
exempt from the demand requirement. The trial court also denied
GLFP's request to amend its complaint to restate the causes of
action as derivative claims, finding the motion to amend "moot."
GLFP now appeals.
1. GLFP was a limited partnership at the time it filed its
complaint in this case. Since that time, GLFP converted to a
limited liability company. We continue to refer to GFLP as a
limited partnership.
2. MB Management Inc. is partially owned by Howard Clark's wife
and is not a party to this litigation.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1(5
GLFP argues that the trial court erred by granting
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. We affirm summary
judgment only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We grant the trial
court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for
correctness. Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133,111, 63 P.3d 721
(citation and quotations omitted). GLFP also argues that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow it to amend its complaint.
We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. See R & R Energies v.
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
%6
GLFP asserts that the trial court erred when it (1)
determined that all of GLFP's claims were derivative claims
belonging to CL Properties; (2) refused to invoke an exception
allowing limited partners to pursue derivative claims directly;
and (3) refused to allow GLFP to amend its complaint. We affirm
the trial court's determination that GLFP's claims concerning
fees, mismanagement, and fiduciary breach are each derivative and
therefore belong to CL Properties, but find that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow GLFP to seek judicial dissolution and
dissolution-related accounting in accordance with Utah Code
sections 48-2a-802 and 49-1-40. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2a-802
(2002), 49-1-40 (2002). We also affirm the trial court's refusal
to find that, under the close corporation exception, GLFP is
exempt from making demand prior to bringing a derivative claim.
Finally, we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of
GLFP's motion to amend its complaint.
I.

Derivative Claims

f7
GLFP claims that as a result of misconduct on the part of
Defendants, GLFP received less than its fair share of
distributions from CL Properties. GLFP asserts that it suffered
direct and distinct harm--separate from any harm suffered by CL
Properties--and that its complaint therefore properly alleges a
direct action. We disagree.
t8
This court looks to principles of corporate law to
distinguish derivative actions from individual actions in the
context of limited partnerships. See Arndt v. First Interstate
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Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91,1(24, 991 P.2d 584 (concluding that "it
is appropriate to apply corporate principles concerning
derivative actions to limited partnerships"). Utah law defines
derivative suits as
those which seek to enforce any right which
belongs to the corporation. Actions alleging
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties,
and appropriation or waste of corporate
opportunities and assets generally belong to
the corporation, and therefore, a shareholder
must bring such actions on its behalf.
Moreover, even though wrongdoing or fraud of
corporate officers may indirectly injure
shareholders, shareholders generally cannot
sue directly for those injuries.
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d
1273, 1280 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations
omitted); see also Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,1(12, 20
P.3d 8 68 ("Claims of mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties,
and appropriation or waste of corporate opportunities are claims
that the corporation has been injured. Accordingly, the cause of
action belongs to the corporation and shareholders may sue only
on its behalf.11). In contrast, a direct claim is one where " ! the
injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder . . . , and not
to the corporation, as where the action is based on contract to
which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to him, or
on a fraud affecting him directly.'" See Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d
at 1280 (quoting Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636,
639 (Utah 1980)).
1(9
Here, GLFP's claims of fiduciary breach, excessive fees,
commingling of fees, and mismanagement of property each fall
squarely in the category of claims that Utah law recognizes as
classically derivative. See, e.g., Richardson, 614 P.2d at 63 9
(noting that fiduciary breach claims are derivative because,
while "directors and officers [of a corporation] stand in a like
relation to the stockholders of the corporation, . . . that
relation is to the stockholders collectively" and therefore the
claim for relief belongs to the corporation (citation omitted));
see also id. at 640 ("The rule in Utah is that mismanagement of
the corporation gives rise to a cause of action in the
corporation, even if the mismanagement results in damage to
stockholders by depreciating the value of the corporation's
stock.").
1(10 GLFP's sole argument in support of asserting its claims
directly instead of derivatively is that GLFP suffered a. harm
distinct from any harm CL Properties suffered when it received
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reduced distributions from CL Properties. In essence, GLFP
argues that Defendants' conduct financially injured CL Properties
in such a way that CL Properties cannot make adequate
distributions to GLFP. In other words, GLFP was injured because
CL Properties was injured. Because GLFP's injury is necessarily
linked to the financial health of CL Properties, however, GLFP's
claim lacks "the distinctive qualities necessary to remove [it]
from the category of derivative claims." Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at
1(22 (holding that losses suffered by plaintiffs attempting to
bring a class action suit were derivative because they were based
on the decreased value of the partnership, and therefore
plaintiffs suffered an "indirect and contingent" loss)/ see also
Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Sch., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 625, 630
(Ark. 1998) (holding that claims were derivative because the
"primary injury" alleged by the stockholders was, in fact, only
for "indirect damages by way of injury to the partnership");
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 16 (Del.
Ch. 1992) (holding that allegations that a general partner's
misconduct directly injured a limited partner's distribution
rights is a derivative claim because it is the equivalent of
alleging that a general partner injured the partnership);
Northern Trust Co. v. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095,
1101 (111. Ct. App. 1995) ("Limited partners do not have a cause
of action for damages to their interest in a limited
partnership.").
fll Accordingly, the trial court correctly identified GLFP's
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, excessive fees, commingling
of fees, and mismanagement as derivative claims belonging to the
corporation or limited partnership.
II.

Dissolution and Accounting Claims

Hl2 GLFP next argues that the trial court erred in granting
Defendants summary judgment on GLFP's judicial dissolution and
accounting claims. The trial court held that these claims were
so squarely rooted in derivative theories of recovery that "they
lack[ed] any basis." We disagree. Utah's Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2a101 to -1107 (2002 & Supp. 2006), provides that limited partners
may seek judicial dissolution "whenever it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
partnership agreement or for failure to comply with the
requirements of [the Act,]" see id. § 48-2a-802. That section
states:
On application by or for a partner or the
director of the division, a district court
having competent jurisdiction may decree
dissolution of the limited partnership

20060440-CA
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whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in conformity with the
partnership agreement or for failure to
comply with the requirements of this chapter.
Id.
Kl3 In its complaint, GLFP sought judicial dissolution and an
accounting based on claims separate from the derivative claims
addressed above. GLFP specifically alleged that Defendants
failed to allow GLFP access to partnership records or information
in violation of section 3 05 of the Act, and that Defendants
failed to share profits, losses, and distributions of the limited
partnership with GLFP in violation of sections 503 and 504 of the
Act. See id. §§ 48-2a-503 to -504 (2002). These allegations set
forth a sufficient basis--separate and distinct from GLFP's
derivative claims--for seeking judicial dissolution. The trial
court therefore erred in refusing to allow GLFP to pursue these
claims.
f14 GLFP also claims that " [a]s part of the dissolution of the
Defendant partnerships, Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting."
Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that the claim for
an accounting is also derivative and belongs to the partnership.
In support of their position, Defendants cite Richardson v.
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980), for the
proposition that a claim for an accounting is always derivative.
We believe Defendants have misapprehended the scope of the
Richardson decision. In Richardson, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs had improperly alleged claims that belonged
to the corporation, including breach of fiduciary duty and
mismanagement. See id. at 639-40. The Richardson court also
found that, as pled in the complaint, the accounting claim was
derivative, stating:
The eleventh cause of action alleges the
possibility of other conversions of [the
corporation's assets] and alleges that the
defendants should be required to account to
the stockholders for all of the assets of
[the corporation] and disgorge themselves of
any assets so converted. This claim also
clearly belongs to the corporation.
Id. at 64 0. The claim for an accounting in Richardson was
asserted as part of a cause of action seeking damages for
conversion. See id. Consequently, that request for an
accounting was inextricably intertwined with the damages claim
and properly belonged to the corporation.

20060440-CA
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fl5 Here, GLFP seeks an accounting "as part of the dissolution"
and not in connection with a claim for damages under a
classically derivative theory. Indeed, the Utah Legislature has
created a statutory right to an accounting for any partner at the
date of dissolution. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-40 (2002) ("The
right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner
. . . at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement
to the contrary."). Thus, although we agree with the trial court
that a claim for an accounting that is part and parcel of a
derivative claim is likewise derivative, we hold that GLFP is
entitled to pursue a direct claim for an accounting in connection
with its cause of action for dissolution. If GLFP proves its
entitlement to dissolution, Utah Code section 48-1-40 gives it a
corresponding right for an accounting at the time of dissolution
absent an agreement to the contrary. See id.
III.

The Close Corporation Exception

fl6 GLFP next argues that, even if some of its claims are
derivative, the trial court should have invoked an exception
allowing limited partners to pursue derivative claims directly.
1[l7 Under principles of corporate law, "the right to seek the
redress of corporate grievances belongs to the corporation to be
exercised by corporate management." Dansie v. City of Herriman,
2006 UT 23,1126, 134 P. 3d 1139. Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides an exception to this general rule by
allowing members or shareholders to bring a derivative action if
certain conditions are met. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1; Dansie,
2006 UT 23 at ^26. To protect the right of the corporation to
govern its own affairs, plaintiffs bringing a derivative claim
must first make demand on the corporation "to have an action
brought and prosecuted in the name of the corporation to redress
the grievances complained of [. ] " Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at <|21
(quotations omitted). Individual shareholders may bring claims
directly against the corporation without first making demand only
in very limited circumstances, and only when complying with
strict pleading requirements. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("The
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort."); see also
Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at ^[27 ("In fact, it will generally require
less effort for the plaintiff to make a demand on the corporation
than to satisfy rule 23.1's stringent pleading requirements.").
Hl8 Utah's Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act similarly
provides that limited partners may bring derivative claims
directly only if:

20060440-CA
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[G]eneral partners with authority to do so
have refused to bring the action and the
general partners1 decision not to sue
constitutes an abuse of discretion or
involves a conflict of interest that prevents
an unprejudiced exercise of judgment, or if
an effort to cause those general partners to
bring the action is not likely to succeed.
Utah Code Ann. §48-2a-1001 (2002). Like rule 23.1, the Act
further requires that a limited partner's complaint must "set
forth with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for
not making the effort." Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1, with Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003 (2002) .
Ul9 Before bringing direct claims against Defendants, GLFP did
not make demand upon CL Properties, nor did its pleadings allege
"with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for
not making the effort." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003. Instead,
GLFP seeks to file its claims pursuant to an exception whereby
shareholders in a closely held corporation may be permitted to
bring derivative claims directly.
1J2 0 In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized a "growing trend" where a court may exempt a
shareholder in a closely held corporation from having to comply
with the strict requirements of derivative actions and instead
bring a claim directly if it finds that to do so will not:
(i) unfairly expose the corporation or
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii)
materially prejudice the interests of
creditors of the corporation, or (iii)
interfere with a fair distribution of the
recovery among all interested persons.
Id. at 1280. And later, in Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of
Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991 P.2d 584, the Utah Supreme Court revisited
the AuroraL Credit analysis in the context of limited
partnerships. See id. at 1(22. In applying the Aurora Credit
analysis, however, the Arndt court merged the concepts of the
close corporation exception with the direct injury requirement,
finding that the Aurora Credit analysis did not remove the claims
from the category of derivative claims because the plaintiffs'
injuries stemmed only from their non-particularized interests in
the subject partnerships. See id. Thus, in Utah, the scope of
the close corporation exception is unclear, as is whether a
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partner may bring classically derivative claims under the
exception absent a particularized injury.3 See Dansie, 2006 UT
23 at K16 ("We have not had the opportunity to fully delineate
the bounds of the [Aurora Credit] exception in Utah.")/ cf. Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1001 (failing to exempt limited partners from
the requirement that the general partners must have refused to
pursue the action before the limited partner may proceed
directly). Indeed, since its decision in Aurora Credit, the Utah
Supreme Court has not sanctioned this exception, and has recently
suggested that the trend to invoke it may have "stopp[ed] in its
tracks" or "retreated," and that it has been "severely limited or
rejected" in some jurisdictions.4 Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at fl6; see
3. In Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991
P.2d 584, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he injury alleged
in Aurora Credit [Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998),] was suffered uniquely by Aurora
Credit and therefore was much more direct than is a typical
derivative claim." Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at i|21. Although Aurora
Credit indicates that the subject corporation was formed by four
individuals, only two shareholders appear to own stock in the
company. See Aurora Credit, 97 0 P.2d at 12 75; see also Peter H.
Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v.
Liberty West Development Inc.: Utah's Close Corporation
Exception to the Derivative Lawsuit Requirement and Case for
Strong Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporations, 20 02 Utah L. Rev.
519, 53 8 ("Aurora Credit involved a dispute between two lone
shareholders . . . .") (Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora
Credit). Thus, Aurora Credit's injury was unique because there
were no other shareholders that could have been injured by the
wrongful acts of the controlling shareholder. The Arndt Court
seems to have limited the close corporation exception to facts
like Aurora Credit where the unusually small allocation of
ownership in the company results in a specialized injury to the
plaintiff.
4. Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Alaska, and Arkansas
each refuse to apply the close corporation exception, recognizing
instead that an individual shareholder can bring a direct action
only when a stockholder "shows a violation of duty owed directly
to him" or when an injury is "peculiar" to him. See, e.g.,
Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 & n.3
(5th Cir. 1987) (applying Mississippi law and noting that a
stockholder may sue directly "'in a case where the stockholder
shows a violation of duty owed directly to him'" (quoting Bruno
v. Southeastern Servs., 385 So. 2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1980)));
Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1997)("[F]or a
shareholder to maintain an individual action, the shareholder
(continued...)
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also Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,1(19, 20 P.3d 868
(refusing to apply the Aurora Credit close corporation exception
where derivative claims belong to the bankruptcy estate); Arndt,
1999 UT 91 at f22 (purporting to apply the Aurora Credit close
corporation exception to limited partnerships but also requiring
a unique injury to plaintiff separate from losses contingent to
those of the partnership).
^21 Assuming without deciding that the close corporation
exception is still viable in Utah, and assuming without deciding
that the exception does, in fact, apply in the context of
limited partnerships, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its broad discretion in refusing to invoke it here.
1(22 The close corporation exception to the distinction between
direct and derivative actions was adopted as a compromise
position by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1992. See
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations § 7.01 (1994) (ALI, Principles of
Corporate Governance); see also Peter H. Donaldson, Breathing
Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West
Development, Inc: Utah's Close Corporation Exception to the
Derivative Lawsuit Requirement and Case for Strong Fiduciary
Duties in Close Corporations, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 519, 527-28
(Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit). Section 7.01 of
the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance recommends a rule
whereby the trial court, in its discretion, may allow a
shareholder in a closely held corporation to proceed directly
with classically derivative claims if the court finds that to do
so will not "(i) unfairly expose the corporation or the
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially
prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii)
interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all
interested persons." ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance
§ 7.01(d). The ALI position, which was adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Aurora Credit, see 970 P.2d at 1280, leaves
4 . (...continued)
must establish a 'special injury1 which is separate and distinct
from that of other shareholders."); Meyerson v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 448 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Neb. 1989) (requiring shareholders
to allege a "separate and distinct injury" if bringing an
individual action); Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora
Services, 2002 Utah L. Rev at 531 (discussing states that have
adopted special injury requirement); cf., e.g., Hikita v. Nichiro
Gvocryo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986) (finding
that shareholders may assert direct claims for breach of contract
to which he is a party); Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244, 247
(Ark. 1998) (same).
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ultimate discretion in applying the exception with the trial
court. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.01(d)
cmt. e. Thus, even if the three prongs of the test are met, the
trial court may deny the shareholder the right to proceed
directly. See Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d at 1280 ("We therefore
hold that a court may allow a minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation to proceed directly against corporate officers."
(emphasis added)); see also Mynatt v. Collis, 57 P.3d 513, 530
(Kan. 2002) ("Even if all three prongs of the test were met, the
district court, in its equitable power and discretion, could deny
[shareholders] the ability to proceed directly.");5 ALI,
Principles of Corporate Governance, 7.01(d) cmt. e (acknowledging
that trial court has discretion in determining if minority
shareholder should be allowed to proceed directly); 12B Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5911.50 (Perm.
Ed. 2000) (same); Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit,
2002 Utah L. Rev. at 527-28 (same).
^[23 Here, the trial court found that "the evidence in the record
simply does not support such an exception" or otherwise show that
the three criterion adopted in Aurora Credit, see 970 P.2d at
128 0, listed above, are satisfied. Parties that could
potentially be affected by GLFP's direct suit against Defendants
are not before the court. MB Management Inc., is a general
partner and owner of CL Management, but is not a party to this
litigation. The GAL Marital Deduction Trust, a limited partner
of CL Management, and the Howard Clark Family Partnership, a
limited partner of CL Properties, are also absent from this
litigation. The trial court was within its discretion in
concluding that to allow GLFP to proceed individually could
subject Defendants to inconsistent liability to these excluded
parties, and could "spawn multiple litigation among the
partnership, the individual partners, and [D] efendants." Kemp v.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984).
i[24 While GLFP claims that each
members of the Clark and Learning
does not bring any new interests
of the above listed partnerships

of these entities are owned by
families "such that adding them
to the case," we disagree. Each
are separate business entities

5. Although few courts have addressed the issue, it appears that
the party seeking to rely upon the close corporation exception
has the burden to come forward with evidence negating the three
prongs identified in section 7.01(d) of ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance. See Brown v. Mailman, No. 95-2181-JWL,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1153, at *10 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 1996)
("[E]ven if the close corporation exception were applied to this
case, the plaintiffs have made no showing to satisfy the three
threshold requirements . . . . ") .
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with distinct legal rights and obligations. We cannot ignore the
separate status of these entities merely because their owners are
related. See NLRB v. Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047,
1051 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Generally, a corporation is a legal
entity, . . . and such a legal entity may not be disregarded
. . . ." (quotations omitted)); see also 18 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 44 (2006) (noting that a corporation is "a
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers and
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who
created it, own it, or whom it employs[ and i]n no legal sense
can the business of a corporation be said to be that of its
individual shareholders").
1(25 We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to invoke the close corporation exception,
even if such an exception is available in Utah to exempt GLFP
from the requirements of the Utah Partnership Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 48-2a-1001.
IV.

Motion to Amend

^26 GLFP's final argument is that it should be allowed to amend
its complaint to either comply with the demand requirements set
forth in Utah Code section 48-2a-1003 and rule 23.1 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure or to allege facts supporting its assertion
that such efforts would be futile. We will not disturb a trial
courts ruling on a motion to amend absent a clear abuse of
discretion. See Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,1J9,
104 P. 3d 1242. The discretion granted a trial court to deny a
motion to amend, however, must be tempered with the mandate of
rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that "leave [to
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R.
Civ. P. 15(a).
^[2 7 In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court cited
favorably the United States Supreme Court's caution that
"'outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and
inconsistent with the spirit" of the rules of civil procedure.
Id. at 1281 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
In the case before us, the trial court ruled that the motion to
amend was "moot." Although neither of the parties were able to
enlighten this court as to the rationale behind that conclusion,
we think it likely that the trial court considered the motion in
the context of its summary judgment disposing of all the claims
asserted by GLFP. As discussed above, we hold that GLFP may
proceed with its dissolution action and, if it proves it is
entitled to dissolution, is also entitled to an accounting.
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Therefore, the basis of the trial court's conclusion that the
motion to amend is moot may no longer be valid. We therefore
reverse the denial of the motion to amend with instructions for
the trial court to reconsider it in the context of the remaining
claims and the specific allegations of any draft amended
complaint submitted by GLFP as required by rule 15. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 15; see also Holmes Dev. L.L.C. v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(57,
48 P. 3d 895 ("[A] motion for leave to amend must be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities in support and by a
proposed amended complaint." (citation omitted)); see also
Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,1144, 79 P.3d 974.6
1|28 "In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should
primarily consider whether granting the motion would subject the
opposing party to unavoidable prejudice 'by having -an issue
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare.' " Aurora
Credit, 970 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In this case, Defendants brought
their motion for summary judgment only five months after the
complaint was filed and after limited discovery. Likewise, the
claims asserted are the same and only the right to bring them
directly is at issue. "The trial court must ultimately assess
all of the factors on remand to determine if leave to amend is
appropriate." Jd.
1(2 9 Any proposed amended complaint filed by GLFP must either
expressly allege that demand was made on the partnership or plead
with particularity why such demand would be futile. See Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003 (requiring a derivative action to "set
forth with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for
not making the effort"). We note, however, that GLFP bears a
significant burden if it seeks to proceed directly on the

6. In Holmes Development L.L.C. v. Cookf 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d
895, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted rule 7.1(b)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in conjunction with the Utah Rules
of Judicial Administration to require that a motion to amend a
complaint be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. See
id. at 1|57; see also Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,^44, 79
P.3d 974. Although rule 7(b)(1) was amended in 2 0 03, the same
exact language relied upon by the Supreme Court in Holmes
Development remains in current rule 7(b). Compare Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(b)(1) (2002), with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) (2006).
Accordingly, we continue to interpret rule 7 as requiring a
plaintiff to attach a proposed amended complaint to a motion to
amend.

20060440-CA

13

derivative claims without first making demand on CL Properties.7
To be exempted from the demand requirement, "the circumstances
must be such that such a demand would be futile and unavailing."
Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23,1)24, 13 P. 3d 1139
(alteration and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the trial
court "must examine first whether Plaintiffs did allege with
particularity why demand would be futile and whether that
allegation establishes that demand would have been futile and
unavailing." Id. In doing so, the court "must exercise
considerable caution before using futility to relieve a
shareholder of his obligation to make the statutorily-required
demand. " IcL. at 1(2 6.
1)3 0 The Utah Supreme Court recognizes only two instances in
which the futility exception will be met: (1) "demand would be
futile if the corporation had specifically and explicitly stated
that it would not pursue the claims brought in the derivative
action [;]" and, (2) demand can be excused if making a demand
would be "substantively detrimental" in that it could "permit []
the alleged perpetrator to cover up his misdeeds or to cause
further harm to the corporation because he had been alerted that
his unlawful conduct had been uncovered." Id. at K2 8. In
evaluating any amended complaint based on the futility exception,
the trial court should consider whether GLFP has alleged facts
which support at least one of these narrow instances in which the
exception may be applied.
CONCLUSION
K31 The trial court correctly determined that GLFP improperly
asserted derivative claims directly when it alleged that
Defendants breached their fiduciary duty, charged CL Properties
excessive fees, commingled those fees to manage other properties,
and mismanaged CL Properties's real estate holdings. Therefore
summary judgment was proper on these claims. Because GLFP sought
dissolution based on Defendant's alleged refusal to comply with
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act--and not based solely on
derivative theories of recovery--we reverse the trial court's
order to the extent it entered summary judgment on that claim.
We also hold that if GLFP proves that it is entitled to
7. "[B]ecause this . . . issue is likely to be raised again upon
remand, we . . . briefly address it here[.]" State v. TorresGarcia, 2006 UT App 45,^23 n.4, 131 P.3d 292; see also State v.
Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986) (noting that it is
appropriate, in the interest of judicial economy, to comment on
"other contentions on appeal that will arise again upon
retrial").
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dissolution, it may seek an accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 48-1-40. Further, we affirm the trial court's refusal to
invoke the close corporation exception and agree that GLFP should
not be allowed, based on this exception, to bring derivative
claims against Defendants directly. Finally, we reverse the
trial court's denial of GLFP's motion to amend its complaint and
remand for reconsideration of this issue in light of the
remaining claims and allegations of GLFP's proposed amended
complaint. We caution, however, that the futility exception to
the demand requirement has been narrowly defined by the Utah
Supreme Court.
^32 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

syna
CarolyrVB. McHugh, Judg

%33 I CONCUR:

incrs. Judcre
M. Billings,
Judge
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DAVIS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part) :
1|34 While leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely
given when justice so requires," Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), this
court recognizes that "a motion for leave to amend must be
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support
and by a proposed amended complaint." Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT
App 339,1(43, 79 P.3d 974 (quotations and citation omitted); see
also Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,^59, 48 P.3d 895
(holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow plaintiff to amend complaint when plaintiff
failed to submit a proposed amended complaint with motion).
Here, GLFP failed to submit a proposed amended complaint and
instead merely promised that it would submit an amended complaint
if the trial court granted its motion to amend. Respecting the
exclusive derivative claims, GLFP failed to make demand on CL
Properties prior to seeking leave to amend its complaint and
failed to adequately allege or otherwise properly plead
entitlement to the futility exception. In addition, the record
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is unclear respecting whether the motion to amend had anything to
do with the dissolution and accounting claims. Thus, in addition
to ruling the motion moot, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing GLFP's motion to amend. See State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,^9, 76 P.3d 1159 (holding that appellate
courts "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record"
(quotations and citation omitted)).
^[35 I see no justification in this case for departure from
Colores and Holmes. Therefore, I dissent only from the
majority's determination that the trial court erred by denying
GLFP's motion for leave to amend its complaint, and I concur in
the remainder of the opinion.
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Exhibit B

CLARK LEAMING
INVESTMENT CO.

CLARK
LEAMING
PROPERTIES

MODULUS
INVESTMENT
CO.

FEES

Pass through, less expenses for
Clark/Learning entities

GEORGE LEAMING
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP

f'GLFP")
Direct harm to GLFP
from reduced or nonexisent distributions

